myanmar old Burma what a sad 77 years

update april 23 I guess myanmar seemed the sleepiest of the asean countries to its membership unti recently- now its a test- wha't's the purpose of asean if it can't even get myanmar (one o0f its smalest economies0 to value the asean way - this at a time when china and usa are wooing the whole region - asean can affrd false steps as china is far its largest trading partner 

According to the ASEAN Secretariat, the total merchandise trade between ASEAN and the seven countries I listed amounted to approximately USD 1.8 trillion in 2020. Here's a breakdown of the trade percentages between ASEAN and each of these countries for that year:

1. China: 17.1%
2. Japan: 10.7%
3. South Korea: 7.5%
4. United States: 7.1%
5. European Union: 7.0%
6. Australia: 3.3%
7. India: 2.8%

and of course asean is many things the first 2 countries in asia i visited  in 1982 (start of 60 asian work epxpereibces) were indoensia tahnks to unilevever and singapire - i love them bot a slow rising giant and teh fastest development of any 6 million people - I also love hong kong and sort of wish it had been eligible to be in asean - nb in what follows brunei is an outlier rich for its people while cartbon rules the world Brunei is a small country with a population of around 460,000 and a land area of only around 5,700 square kilometers. However, it is one of the richest countries in the world on a per capita basis due to its significant oil and gas resources.

approximate percentages of the total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of ASEAN contributed by each member state in my previous answer. Here it is again for your reference:

1. Indonesia: 38.3% Mineral fuels, (eg palm) oils, distillation products, machinery
2. Thailand: 19.5% Electrical machinery and equipment, machinery and mechanical appliances, rubber
3. Malaysia: 14.8% Electrical machinery and equipment, mineral fuels, oils, distillation products (?rubber)
4. Singapore: 7.7% Integrated circuits, refined petroleum
5. Philippines: 7.4% Electrical machinery and equipment, machinery and mechanical appliances, mineral fuels, oils, distillation products
6. Vietnam: 7.0% Electrical machinery and equipment, footwear, textiles
7. Myanmar: 2.0% Gas, wood products
8. Cambodia: 1.3% Knit or crochet clothing, footwear
9. Brunei: 0.3% petroleum
10. Laos: 0.2% Copper, electricity

These figures do not include tourism of which thailand leads in mass tourism whereas eg simagpore would elad business conferences etc- indonesia also has special tirist/business zone ie bali; also note impact of remittances The Philippines is known for having a large number of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs), and remittances from these workers are a significant contributor to the country's foreign currency reserves. In 2020, remittances from OFWs amounted to approximately USD 29.9 billion, which represented around 9.3% of the country's GDP and around 9.2% of its foreign exchange earnings.

The importance of remittances to the Philippines' economy cannot be overstated. Remittances support millions of families in the country, contribute to consumer spending, and help boost the overall economy.

nb brunei is an outlier ----

what's the top 2 exports by asean country

Here are the top two exports by ASEAN countries based on the latest available data:

1. Brunei: Crude petroleum, petroleum gas
2. Cambodia: Knit or crochet clothing, footwear
3. Indonesia: Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products, machinery and mechanical appliances
4. Laos: Copper, electricity
5. Malaysia: Electrical machinery and equipment, mineral fuels, oils, distillation products
6. Myanmar: Gas, wood products
7. Philippines: Electrical machinery and equipment, machinery and mechanical appliances, mineral fuels, oils, distillation products
8. Singapore: Integrated circuits, refined petroleum
9. Thailand: Electrical machinery and equipment, machinery and mechanical appliances, rubber
10. Vietnam: Electrical machinery and equipment, footwear, textiles

It's important to note that these rankings are subject to change over time and based on various factors such as economic conditions and global demand for certain products.

whats the ups and downs of the other asean countries 

my dad (The Economist's Norman Macrae) served as teen navigator in allied bomber command stationed in burma as myanmar was then called; from the air 50 years ahead of other journalists and policy makers his mind was imprinted with google maps of the great bay of bengal to the west asean down to singapote to south east- continental china over which his then enemy japan might engage to north east; why is it in 2021 the country once beloved or orwell and kipling could make life so miserable for peoples; (in air force out of myanmar you got 6 dangerous hours in air followed by 24 hours down time where my father had 3 books to read 2 by adam smith and one by keynes -it was this ideology of celebaring human employement he used to turn the economist into a thrird ranked weekly into a one of a kind global)

dad married the daughter of sir kenneth kemps; 4 generations of kemps had been scottish pharmacists in bombay until sir keen studied law, became chief justiced; dialogued with Gandhi for 20 yeras before writing up legalese of india's independence; I am not saying this to boast- simply dad knew asia as much as he knew europe form being home schooled for most of his youth in places like british embassy in stalin's moscow -stalin and hitler were the 2 mademn humans needed to outlast; the first 180 yeras of applying smith and watts machines out of glasgow had gone disatrously wrong as it represented the intersts of 7 white empires (less than 15% of huamns and within that extremely few really powerful white men) we have had our second last best chnace mediating united natuons from 1945 now in 2021 we find ousrelves at last best chnace 

one of the problems all over asia is how the british exited - absolutley every country needed independence but teh systems needed chnaging not just a top down handover to miltarries or bureaucratics 

you can see my father's survey in the economist of which asian countries rise/fall from 1962- as keenedy agreed in 1962 there were 2 asia rising models 1005 village employmemt/microentreprenurship and hi-tech suprcities designing win-win sme supply chains which japan's keiretsu and korea's chaebol facilitated along with taiwan gutsy traders- there's never been a greater trading mindest than the chinese (fiaspora) frred from eg britain's insistence of opium as a currency or freed from staliesque communism; by 1972 the diaspora chinese were the 3ed most sustaible bankers to global trade after isa and japan- as permy fathere 1977 economist survey- imagine heaven r hell which now depends on one fifth of all humans - chinese mainland race to educate their one child generation and end poverty; the greatest economic miracle studies what china did between 1972 and 2010- part 2 of that miracle need us-china to lead sdgoalsgeneration -dont you think?

how do you start up a refugee torn place? and become worlds largest ngo partnership and sdg generation's shining example

 sir fazle abed gave 50 years of entrepreneurial knowhow to this question as he converted his career age 33 from the oil industry's leading Asian engineer - this ranged in 1972 from brac building a lab  (1500 homes) of 100000 villagers which he brought partners to design village business solutions - last mile health services microfranchises village mothers could operate; last mile food production starting with rice science (anyone who knew of boralug's work could redesign local faming to end starvation- one of the greatest open source gifts of American R&D); but if you dont have 50 years to empower women ; he spent his last 2 decades on simpler starting points such as what development can be started around ay 20 children- one of the  two simplest university research miracles ever seen is now scaling across 50 countries is early childhood playschools 

brac university organised the first masters of ECP - postgrads could help build early childhood schools with bangladesh mothers and business psrtners such as lego ; and once the rohinga refugee crisis in myanmar began there too- the last world prize to be awarded sir fazle was by charles yidan 2019 out of hong kong - the most exciting billioonaire searcher of who can save the world by celebrating transformational education that i can find after 40 years of looking with Economist readers of 1984's 2025 report - and here is a summer 2021 paper on playschools for refugee children suffering the most stressful conditions a could grow up in

I am convinced that if you are not happy with community anywhere you live early childhood is a core sustainability generation multiplier to focus on- the data on how to do this even in the most broken communities around the world makes early childhood schools one of abed's great legacies wherever asian new universities partner in demonstrating deep implementation of innovations human beings need the 2020s to ground!

for more tourd of abed miracles try A0  A1  A2   A3  A4 - have we left out your abedian favorite -rsvp chris.macrae@yahoo.co.uk

sample the news from jan 2020- so much of asian sustainability depended on china-myanamar-bangladesh-kolkata corridor- why didnt the whole world help?

The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor: Delays Ahead

Sudha Ramachandran

Although no new deals were struck during People’s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping’s trip to Myanmar on January 17 and 18, the visit was significant for several reasons. The visit was the first by a PRC president to Myanmar in 19 years, and the first by Xi to this country in his role as president. The visit was widely touted as marking the 70th anniversary of the establishment of relations between the PRC and Myanmar. However, Xi’s first trip abroad this year was aimed at expediting implementation of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a key component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (CGTN, January 17). During the visit, the two governments signed 33 agreements, memorandums of understanding, protocols and letters of exchange relating to railways, industrial and power projects, and trade. Several of these agreements firm up Myanmar’s commitment to the CMEC’s three central components: the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ), which includes a deep-sea port, an industrial park and other projects; the China-Myanmar Border Economic Cooperation Zone; and an urban development plan for Yangon (The Irrawaddy, January 18).

del rosso - carnegie from 2008 carnegie-tsingua need assessments also new needs assessment - seecarnegie.org replacing elderly us scholars with new blood -additional year suport mandarin skills - quantuative/formal modeling china fellowship program of wilson need deeply more nuanced mediation us-chia our carnegie alums 10:00am – 11:00am ET Keynote Speech Moderated by Abraham Denmark. Opening remarks by Robert Litwak, Senior Vice President and Director of International Security Studies at the Wilson Center, and Stephen Del Rosso, Program Director, International Peace & Security at the Carnegie Corporation of New York. Keynote Speaker: J. Stapleton Roy, Founding Director Emeritus and Distinguished Scholar, Kissinger Institute on China and the United States. 12:30pm – 02:00pm ET The Chinese Authoritarian Model and Its Global Impact Moderated by Charles Kraus. Under President Xi Jinping, several trends—technological advancements in surveillance and big data, an institutional strengthening of the CCP, and a growing authoritarianism—converged to witness a more aggressive approach to domestic security in places such as Tibet, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang. In China’s northwestern province of Xinjiang, the government has engaged in a widespread campaign of repression, mass surveillance, and detainment. In support of this effort over the past decade, China has implemented a surveillance system that combines traditional methods with high-technology such as facial recognition. With this expansion in surveillance, some analysts have identified a “China Model” of authoritarianism in opposition to liberal democracy that some warn could be exported elsewhere. Elsewhere in the world, China has begun exporting its suite of surveillance technologies to numerous countries throughout the world, an initiative that triggers some concern about negative impacts on democracy and governance. What does this approach to domestic security and surveillance mean for the international system? What does this issue indicate for the future of China and its relationships with other powers? Fellows: Darren Byler: “Chinese Technologies of Population Management on the New Silk Road” Alexander Dukalskis: “Authoritarian Image Management & PRC ‘Advertorials’ in Foreign Publications” Sheena Chestnut Greitens: “Assessing the Global Impact of Chinese Surveillance Technology” 02:30pm – 04:00pm ET Global Norms, Governance, and Chinese Policymaking Moderated by Robert Daly. The Chinese government adopts an increasingly assertive role in multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations, even as it founds alternate fora, like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. It is conceivable that a stronger China will push for alterations to existing and emerging rules and norms to suit its interests. Across ungoverned spaces or areas of contested international governance, such as outer space, the deep sea, and poles, China has attempted to emerge as a global leader in norm-setting. Data policy constitutes another arena of contestation where China exerts increasing influence while advancing a competing vision of privacy and internet governance often at odds with Western models. However, Chinese policymaking does not occur in a vacuum, and a surprising history of “policy collaging” points to the oftentimes hidden outside influences on Chinese norms, legislation, and reform efforts. Fellows: Wendy Leutert: “The International Origins of China’s National Champions.” Xiao Liu: “Understanding China’s Governance Space of Personal Data” THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 4 10:00am – 11:30am ET China’s Foreign Policy Along a Contested Periphery Moderated by Abraham Denmark. In recent years, President Xi Jinping of China has embarked upon a more assertive and active Chinese foreign policy, particularly in its own neighborhood. 2020 witnessed a deadly dispute erupt over the Line of Actual Control with India that spurred a sharp increase in India-China tensions. Shortly thereafter, the United States and India signed an important bilateral defense agreement, the BECA, which signals stronger ties in the face of rising Chinese involvement in the region. In Pakistan, China has launched the geopolitically-significant China-Pakistan Economic Corridor as part of its Belt and Road Initiative. The question of China’s influence over Pakistani decision-making bears importance on India’s rise and the United States’ role in South Asia. Elsewhere, Taiwan is facing increasing pressure from China in the aftermath of President Tsai Ing-wen’s reelection in 2020. Within this tense atmosphere, the Taiwan-Japan-United States trilateral relationship will grow increasingly important for stability in the region. Going forward, these tensions and the future of the wider region will hinge upon China’s foreign policy approaches to its periphery, as well as the responses of local actors and great powers such as India, the United States, and Japan. Fellows: Christopher Colley: “An Emerging Great Power Triangle? China, India, and the United States in the Indian Ocean.” Isaac Kardon: “China’s ‘New Era’ of Influence on Pakistan.” Adam Liff: “The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Taiwan.” 12:30pm – 02:00pm ET The BRI and Chinese Influence in the Global South Moderated by Jennifer Turner. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) currently reaches a wide swath of countries with a particular emphasis on Southeast Asia and the broader Global South. Of China's numerous investments, nuclear exports constitute one of the key areas with the potential for strong impact geopolitically.  China’s hydropower investments in Southeast Asia also have the potential to meet growing energy demand while mitigating climate change. However, they also bring challenges with cross-boundary water governance, environmental damage, and large-scale displacement of communities. Elsewhere, concerns about China’s intentions and the environmental impact have forced China to deploy new discourses throughout the Global South centered on a green BRI. Is this a genuine embrace of environmentally-minded development or a clever marketing strategy? Exploring and parsing out the on-the-ground facts and bird’s eye view of the BRI will expand our understanding and enable policymakers to craft effective and timely responses to this geopolitically significant effort. Fellows: Jessica Liao: “China’s Green Mercantilism and Environmental Governance: A New Belt and Road to the Global South?” Lami Kim: “Nuclear Belt and Road: China’s Nuclear Exports and Its Implications for World Politics.” Cecilia Han Springer: “Environmental Sustainability and China’s Hydropower Development in Southeast Asia.” 02:30pm – 04:00pm ET Is a New Cold War Inevitable? Chinese Intentions and the Role of Misperception Moderated by Robert Daly. Over the past four years, policy discussion on the potential for a second Cold War have expanded greatly as tensions rise in the U.S.-China relationship. Indeed, great power competition to varying degrees has become bipartisan consensus under the Trump administration. On issues ranging from trade and human rights to intellectual property and international security, the United States and China increasingly identify the other as their chief rival. However, as shown in the American experience with the People’s Republic of China between 1949 and 1972, misperception and mirroring often cloud intelligence analysis and policy decision-making processes. On the other hand, American and Chinese national interests and strategic intentions are clearly divergent. On issues such as the South China Sea, China’s intentions and desired end state will greatly impact the course of U.S.-China relations. Understanding the nature of the competition and its historical parallels can serve to guide policymakers and reduce the risk of escalation. To what extent are the United States and China locked into competition? Are the current tensions the result of policy choices or the natural outcome of divergent national interests? Fellows: Sara Castro: “Lop Nur and the U.S. Intelligence Gaze: Evaluating the American Intelligence Process During China’s Nuclearization.” Oriana Skylar Mastro: “The Heart of the Matter: Understanding Chinese Intentions in the South China Sea and Implications for U.S. Strategy.” Joshua Shifrinson: “The U.S.-China Competition in Historical and Theoretical Perspective.” EVENT SPONSORS ASIA PROGRAM KISSINGER INSTITUTE ON CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES CHINA ENVIRONMENT FORUM HISTORY AND PUBLIC POLICY PROGRAM OverviewAgenda OVERVIEW AGENDA Over the past year, the 2020 Wilson China Fellows have undertaken policy research on a range of vital issues relevant to the rise of China and the future of U.S.-China ties. From February 3rd to the 4th, our Fellows will publicly present and debate their findings on topics ranging from international security to the environment in order to address important policy questions, such as: What does China’s approach to domestic security and surveillance in Xinjiang mean for the international system? How will its exports of this technology impact the world at large? What role does China’s influence play in global norms, governance, and policymaking in international institutions, especially pertaining to emergent issues such as big data, internet governance, and “new frontiers”? How does China’s assertive foreign policy impact security along its contested periphery? What is the extent of Chinese influence in Pakistan, the state of its competition with India, and the future of Taiwan's growing ties with Japan and the United States? What is the impact of China’s Belt and Road Initiative on the environment and geopolitics in Southeast Asia? How do these investments affect China’s influence in the region? To what extent are the United States and China locked into competition and what role does misperception play in their rivalry? What are China's intentions and strategy towards the South China Sea and its other vital national interests? Please join us virtually as the 2020 Wilson China Fellows present their findings and policy recommendations on February 3rd and 4th. Find the full agenda and list of speakers above, under the "Agenda" tab. You may submit questions for the speakers by emailing asia@wilsoncenter.org or tweeting us @AsiaProgram. Panelists From Left to Right, Top Row: Darren Byler, Sara Castro, Christopher Colley, Alexander Dukalskis, Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Isaac Kardon, Lami Kim. Bottom Row: Wendy Leutert, Jessica Liao, Adam Liff, Xiao Liu, Oriana Skyler Mastro, Joshua Shifrinson, Cecilia Han Springer IMAGE CREDIT Learn more about the 2020 Wilson Fellows INTRODUCTIONS Robert S. Litwak Senior Vice President and Director of International Security Studies Stephen Del Rosso Program Director, International Peace & Security at the Carnegie Corporation of New York KEYNOTE SPEAKER J. Stapleton Roy Distinguished Fellow; Founding Director Emeritus, Kissinger Institute on China and the United States MODERATORS Abraham Denmark Director, Asia Program Charles Kraus Deputy Director, History and Public Policy Program Robert Daly Director, Kissinger Institute on China and the United States Jennifer L. Turner Director, China Environment Forum & Manager, Global Choke Point Initiative PANELISTS Sheena Chestnut Greitens Wilson China Fellow; Associate Professor at the Lyndon B. Johnson School at the University of Texas at Austin. Darren Byler Wilson China Fellow; Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Center for Asian Studies, University of Colorado Boulder Alexander Dukalskis Wilson China Fellow; Associate Professor, the School of Politics and International Relations at University College Dublin Xiao Liu Wilson China Fellow; Assistant Professor at McGill University and Fellow at the Centre for the Fourth Industrial Revolution of the World Economic Forum. Wendy Leutert Wilson China Fellow; GLP-Ming Z. Mei Chair of Chinese Economics and Trade, Hamilton Lugar School of Global and International Studies and the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at Indiana University. Isaac Kardon Wilson China Fellow; Assistant Professor, Department of Strategic and Operational Research at the U.S. Naval War College Adam Liff Wilson China Fellow; Associate Professor of East Asian International Relations, Hamilton Lugar School of Global and International Studies, Indiana University and Director of the “21st Century Japan Politics & Society Initiative” (21JPSI). Christopher Colley Wilson China Fellow; Assistant Professor of Security Studies at the National Defense College of the United Arab Emirates Lami Kim Wilson China Fellow; Assistant Professor at the U.S. Army War College and Adjunct Fellow at Pacific Forum. Cecilia Han Springer Wilson China Fellow; Senior Researcher at Boston University's Global China Initiative. Jessica Liao Wilson China Fellow; Assistant Professor of Political Science, North Carolina State University. Oriana Skylar Mastro Wilson China Fellow; Center Fellow at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) Sara Castro Wilson China Fellow; Assistant Professor, United States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Department of History Joshua Shifrinson Wilson China Fellow; Assistant Professor of International Relations, Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University. HOSTED BY ASIA PROGRAM The Asia Program promotes policy debate and intellectual discussions on U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific as well as political, economic, security, and social issues relating to the world’s most populous and economically dynamic region.   Read more KISSINGER INSTITUTE ON CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES The mission of Kissinger Institute on China and the United States is to ensure that informed engagement remains the cornerstone of U.S.-China relations.  Read more CHINA ENVIRONMENT FORUM Since 1997, the China Environment Forum's mission has been to forge U.S.-China cooperation on energy, environment, and sustainable development challenges. We play a unique nonpartisan role in creating multi-stakeholder dialogues around these issues.  Read more HISTORY AND PUBLIC POLICY PROGRAM The History and Public Policy Program uses history to improve understanding of important global dynamics, trends in international relations, xand American foreign policy.  Read more

x ambassador roy -quote on washington - depotism - 50 years 20th century foreign service

- how easy it is abuse absolute power

why conern on rise of china?

media advice on what to do from good to horrid

scattered summary 

america thinks anout change in china in much too short a time span

why has us policy of engament in china become unpopular  with pundits - mirscilus human develop,ent - wester educate chinese governing chia institutions- modernised education ystem- -- wealth flows

modernised economy/society and its poitican system

dont prejudge where china is evolving over a few short years

globalisation winners and losers long term pattern n=both usa and china

focus on foreign policy goals not changes to its domestic system

if we cant help remake cuba why do we think we can rebuild china, afghanistan anywhere

more dsplay ore consciousness of danfers of nuclear war

lessons of cold war forgotten

4 dont underestimatedamage recovering from our soft power over last 4 years- all over world countries looking at cyhina and usa - china life is normal ; usa shutdown- china vaccine may work- china still growing; 

us nit psatry to 2 trades tcpp rcp (mchina member rcp)

usa not well posituoned to take on onu=tegrated challenges other nations around world want supporton

us income discrepancues soarung - never seen such disparity - top 10 % own 88%

nothing forbottom 50%

friennd/allies could rely on reasonNLE CONSSTENY OVER TIME- DONT ASSUME USA CAN JUST RETURN- LOSS OF CONFIDENCE OF WORLDS NATIONS

 us has abundat hyman and natural resources-could have celbrated wise in china-all past assumptions now broken

federalist paper63maddison -